

How to start a dark kitchen from scratch: the mistakes that burn CapEx and the method that defends margin



By **Diego F. Parra** · Updated 2026-09-09 · Dark Kitchens & Foodtech

QUICK VERDICT

Starting a dark kitchen from scratch pays off only when digital-channel unit economics are calculated BEFORE the lease is signed: aggregator commission, packaging, waste and acquisition cost all inside the same plate. A dark kitchen is not a cheaper restaurant; it is a different business, with a P&L where platform commission absorbs 15% to 30% of the ticket and where the savings from having no dining room get eaten by the channel unless you manage it. The market supports the thesis: independent operators held 61,7% of cloud kitchen revenue in 2025 (Grand View Research, 2025) and Mexico City went from a handful to more than 1.200 active dark kitchens, up 40% since 2023 (CANIRAC, 2025). The opening mistake is almost always identical — equipment sized for ten virtual brands, launch menu with 45 references that will never fit an 18-square-metre line. The correct method reverses the order: one brand, eight SKUs, food cost at or below 32%, prime cost measured weekly. Only then does brand two open.

2026 left delivery operators in an awkward spot: digital demand keeps growing —Latin America's meal delivery segment will exceed USD 39 billion by 2027 according to Statista (2024)— yet aggregator commission structures did not move in their favour. Anyone starting a dark kitchen from scratch inherits a P&L where the channel is simultaneously the sales engine and the main creditor of margin.

Platform concentration defines territory risk. In Brazil, iFood holds 87% of e-food bookings (Statista, 2024) and works with more than 380.000 partner establishments across more than 1.500 cities (iFood, 2024); in the United States, Uber Eats closed 2024 with 26,1% share and Grubhub with 6,3% (Earnest Analytics, 2024); in Spain, Glovo runs near 31% and Just Eat near 26% (Ken Research, 2025). An operator dependent on a single platform does not negotiate: it complies.

That is the frame Diego F. Parra and Masterrestaurant apply to the decision to start a dark kitchen from scratch — not a cheap real-estate bet, but a delivery unit economics exercise where every commission point, every gram of packaging and every minute of ticket time converts into EBITDA. What follows breaks that calculation down by revenue band, by input-inflation scenario and by level of operational maturity.

SIDE-BY-SIDE COMPARISON

Side-by-side comparison

	IMPROVISED BUILD-OUT (THE FREQUENT MISTAKE)	MASTERRESTAURANT METHOD (UNIT ECONOMICS FIRST)
Start-up CapEx (20-35 m² kitchen, 1 brand)	✗ USD 85.000-140.000: line oversized for 4-6 brands that do not exist yet; real equipment utilisation below 40%	✓ USD 28.000-55.000: line sized to an 8-SKU mix, 70-80% utilisation target; remaining CapEx released against proven revenue
Food cost per dish	✗ 36-41% with no recipe costing: packaging and digital-channel waste never entered the calculation	✓ 32% or lower with packaging and waste inside the spec; theoretical vs actual cost measured weekly
Aggregator commission inside the P&L	✗ Discovered on the first settlement: 15-30% of ticket deducted from gross revenue, with no differentiated channel price	✓ Channel price calculated backwards from the contracted commission; target contribution margin at 52% or higher after commission

	IMPROVISED BUILD-OUT (THE FREQUENT MISTAKE)	MASTER RESTAURANT METHOD (UNIT ECONOMICS FIRST)
Platform dependency (territory risk)	✗ 90-100% of sales on a single aggregator; in concentrated markets such as Brazil, with iFood at 87% of bookings (Statista, 2024), exposure is total	✓ Target 55-70% aggregators / 30-45% owned channel and WhatsApp by month 12; contract renegotiated with measured volume
Menu size and line complexity	✗ 38-52 references at launch; average ticket time 22-28 minutes and 6-9% incomplete orders	✓ 8-12 SKUs sharing 70% of inputs; ticket time target 11-14 minutes and errors below 2%
BOH/FOH automation with AI	✗ None: manual order intake across three tablets and inventory counted in a notebook	✓ Orders consolidated on one board, food cost variance alerts and AI voice on confirmations; performance reference: 90% order completion and roughly 60 seconds per order on White Castle's voice AI (SoundHound, 2024)
Break-even	✗ Never calculated: the assumption is that '60 orders a day carries it'; month 5 arrives and cash flow breaks	✓ Break-even computed in orders/day and USD/month, stressed at 5%, 12% and 20% input inflation
Timing of the second brand	✗ Month 2-3, to 'use the kitchen'; complexity doubles before brand one stabilises	✓ Month 7-9, only if brand one holds net-of-commission contribution margin at 18% or above for three consecutive months

Chapter 1 — How much margin does a dark kitchen order actually leave?

A USD 14 digital ticket leaves roughly USD 4.60 in contribution margin, and that figure —not the lease— governs the entire build. The arithmetic is dry:

a 27% aggregator commission takes USD 3.78, packaging eats USD 1.10, food cost at 32% adds USD 4.48, and whatever survives is the only money paying for kitchen labor, energy and debt. With Uber Eats at 26.1% of the US market and Grubhub at 6.3% as 2024 closed, per Earnest Analytics (2024), nobody negotiates rates on goodwill. Here sits the tension almost no operator resolves: the channel bringing the volume is the same one cutting unit revenue, and the bridge is not fighting the commission, it is raising the ticket and shrinking packaging until margin per order can carry the 180 daily orders your rent demands. Below USD 500 thousand a year, the line that sinks the P&L is not payroll: it is packaging and transit waste.

Chapter 2 — Under 500 thousand in annual revenue: the band where packaging decides

We are describing an operation of 90 to 130 orders per day on a single heavy shift, where USD 0.40 of difference in a cardboard container is worth between USD 13,000 and USD 19,000 annually, more than a second line cook costs. Independents held 61.7% of cloud kitchen revenue in 2025 (Grand View Research, Cloud Kitchen Market), so this band is the sector norm rather than the exception. My recommendation at this scale stands untouched: lease shared square meters, hold the menu to eight dishes coming off one mise en place, and hire no in-house marketing until contribution margin per order clears USD 5. Between USD 500 thousand and USD 1 million in revenue a new cost appears that the previous band never paid: buying visibility inside the aggregator, which typically runs another 4% to 7% on channel sales. Stacked on the base commission, that layer pushes total extraction past 30 points of the ticket, and the road forks there.

Chapter 3 — From 500 thousand to 1 million: when acquisition cost enters the plate cost

Mexico already runs more than 1,200 active dark kitchens, up 40% from 2023 according to CANIRAC (2025), and that density raises the price of every click in saturated delivery zones. What I advise in this stretch is hard to swallow: open a second brand inside the same kitchen before you open a second kitchen, because the new brand buys you a second storefront at zero marginal rent and barely 6% to 9% more operating cost. Past the million-dollar mark, your largest exposure stopped being the kitchen and became platform concentration. iFood handles 87% of e-food bookings in Brazil (Statista, 2024) and reports more than 380,000 partner establishments across over 1,500 cities (iFood, 2024), with a single month of 100 million orders in August 2024; in Spain, Glovo sits near 31% and Just Eat near 26% (Ken Research, 2025). Consider the counterfactual: if the aggregator supplying 70% of your sales lifts commission by two points and you bill USD 1.4 million, you lose USD 19,600 of EBITDA in one quarter without a single change inside your operation.

Chapter 4 — Above 1 million: territory risk outweighs food cost

That is why at this scale I demand an owned channel worth at least 18% of sales, even though its ticket converts worse for the first six months. Above USD 5 million you enter branded operations with a face —the television chef, the licensed themed format— and three costs arrive that smaller bands never see: brand royalty between 3% and 6% of gross sales, presentation standards that double packaging cost to USD 2.20 per order, and a quality control team nobody budgets until the first viral review lands. North America holds 40.8% of the kitchen robotics market (Grand View Research, Food Robotics Market), and in this band automation genuinely pays: at 600 daily orders, a frying arm amortizes in eighteen to twenty-four months. What does not pay is an inflated ticket without backup kitchen capacity; the famous brand multiplies launch demand and then punishes dispatch time by the third weekend.

Chapter 5 — Above 10 million: a network of nodes, not scattered kitchens

Past USD 10 million you no longer manage kitchens, you manage coverage density, and the marginal cost of node number twelve decides your consolidated EBITDA. The reference model lives in quick commerce: Blinkit operates close to 2,100 dark stores and plans 900 more by March 2027 according to Storyboard18 (2025), a logic of small nearby nodes that transfers cleanly to prepared food. In this band logistics cost per order falls from 11% to 7% of sales once the average delivery radius drops from 4.5 to 2.8 kilometers, and those four points on USD 12 million equal USD 480,000 a year. Grab sustains 53.9% of Southeast Asian food delivery (Momentum

Works, 2024), evidence that scale is won through coverage rather than menu. Diego F. Parra and Masterrestaurant sequence a dark kitchen build the opposite way the market does: plate arithmetic first, square meters afterward.

Chapter 6 — The correct order of the build decisions

An operator who starts from the property ends up justifying a USD 2,800 monthly lease with an order forecast that never materialized; one who starts from the number knows that, at USD 4.60 of margin per ticket, that lease requires 61 orders daily just to cover rent, before payroll. Latin America's meal delivery segment will pass USD 39 billion in 2027 according to Statista (2024), and that growth is precisely what deceives: demand climbs while commission stays put. For years I treated commission as a marketing expense, and I was wrong: it subtracts from unit revenue and belongs in the plate cost ahead of every other line. The first automation that pays inside a dark kitchen is not the cooking, it is order capture and routing. White Castle rolled voice AI into more than 100 drive-thrus by late 2024 and reports a 90% order completion rate at roughly 60 seconds per transaction (Sound-Hound via Restaurant Dive, 2024); Wendy's took FreshAI to between 500 and 600 US locations by the end of 2025 per CNBC (2024).

Chapter 7 — Channel technology: what to automate, and in what order

Translated into your P&L: every minute shaved off ticket time frees capacity without one extra square meter of kitchen, and during peak hour that buys 12 to 18 additional orders. Autonomous delivery is not your lever yet — Starship completed 5.8 million deliveries in 2024 (Forbes, 2025) and still covers narrow geography— so spend where the order comes in, not where it goes out. The order of decisions. The improvised route starts with the property and ends with the number; the method starts with the number. Once you work out that a USD 14 ticket carrying 27% commission, USD 1,10 of packaging and 32% food cost leaves roughly USD 4,60 of contribution margin, the lease stops being an aesthetic choice and becomes a hard ceiling on orders per day. How commission is treated. Aggregator commission is not marketing spend; it is a direct reduction of revenue per unit sold, which is why it enters plate costing ahead of every other line.

Chapter 8 — Six differences that decide margin

With Uber Eats at 26,1% of the US market and Grubhub at 6,3% (Earnest Analytics, 2024), the fee conversation goes to whoever arrives with measured volume and live alternatives. Menu complexity. Every extra reference multiplies inventory, waste and error probability, and in delivery an error cannot be repaired with floor hospitality because there is no floor. Eight SKUs sharing inputs hold ticket time at 11-14 minutes; forty references push it past 22, platform rating drops, visibility follows and sales go with it. The dependency structure. An operator with 90% of revenue on one platform carries territory risk equivalent to a restaurant with a single meat supplier. In Brazil, where iFood moved 100 million orders in a single month (iFood via Statista, 2024), that dependency is paid in fees; the method builds the owned channel in week four, not during the crisis. The role of automation.

Chapter 9 — Six differences that decide margin — in practice

Here is where the Masterrestaurant foodtech angle contributes: AI does not replace cooks in a 30-square-metre kitchen, it replaces the administrative work that consumes the owner's afternoons —consolidating orders from three tablets, reconciling inventory, catching food cost variance before the month closes—. The maturity benchmark exists: White Castle passed 100 AI-voice drive-thrus by late 2024 (Restaurant Dive, 2024) and Wendy's projected FreshAI across 500-600 US locations by the end of 2025 (CNBC, 2024). Expansion discipline. A dark

kitchen that opens brand two before stabilising brand one does not diversify, it fragments. The criterion is arithmetic and allows no enthusiasm: three consecutive months with net-of-commission contribution margin above 18% and errors under 2%, or brand two waits.

POINT BY POINT

Criterion by criterion: improvisation versus method

TIMING OF THE FINANCIAL MODEL

A · IMPROVISED BUILD-OUT (THE FREQUENT MISTAKE)

Modelled after the lease is signed and equipment bought; commission surfaces on the first settlement

B · MASTERRESTAURANT Modelled in the

first 15 days, with commission, packaging and waste inside the plate before any commitment

Verdict: Method. A lease demanding 140 daily orders in a 70-order market cannot be fixed with sales effort.

CAPEX SIZING

A · IMPROVISED BUILD-OUT (THE FREQUENT MISTAKE)

USD 85.000-140.000 for a 4-6 brand scenario; equipment utilisation under 40%

B · MASTERRESTAURANT USD 28.000-

55.000 sized to a real 8-12 SKU mix; 70-80% utilisation and purchases deferred against revenue

Verdict: Method. CapEx frozen in idle equipment is the industry's quietest form of debt.

MENU STRUCTURE

A · IMPROVISED BUILD-OUT (THE FREQUENT MISTAKE)

38-52 references, 22-28 minute ticket time, 6-9% incomplete orders

B · MASTERRESTAURANT 8-12 SKUs

sharing 70% of inputs, 11-14 minute ticket time, errors under 2%

Verdict: Method. In delivery the platform rating is distribution: rating falls, visibility falls, sales fall.

TERRITORY RISK MANAGEMENT

A · IMPROVISED BUILD-OUT (THE FREQUENT MISTAKE)

90-100% of sales on one aggregator; zero fee leverage

B · MASTERRESTAURANT 55-70%

platforms and 30-45% owned channel by month 12, with two aggregators live

Verdict: Method. With Glovo near 31% and Just Eat near 26% in Spain (Ken Research, 2025), the second platform is real leverage.

AUTOMATION AND DATA CONTROL

A · IMPROVISED BUILD-OUT (THE FREQUENT MISTAKE)

Three tablets, notebook inventory, food cost known at month-end

B · MASTERRESTAURANT Single order

board, weekly variance alerts, AI-assisted confirmations

Verdict: Method. The automation that pays in a 30 m² kitchen is administrative, not line robotics.

CRITERION FOR BRAND TWO

A · IMPROVISED BUILD-OUT (THE FREQUENT MISTAKE)

Month 2-3, to exploit installed capacity

B · MASTERRESTAURANT Month 7-9, after three months of net-of-commission contribution margin at 18% or above

Verdict: Method. Adding a brand without stable theoretical cost does not spread risk: it multiplies it.

RESISTANCE TO INPUT INFLATION

A · IMPROVISED BUILD-OUT (THE FREQUENT MISTAKE)

No scenarios; a 12% increase erases the quarter's profit

B · MASTERRESTAURANT Model stressed at 5%, 12% and 20%, with channel-price and mix levers predefined

Verdict: Method. A stress scenario does not forecast the future; it names the lever you pull when it arrives.

SIDE-BY-SIDE COMPARISON

What the improvised build-out does HIGH STRUCTURAL RISK

- ✗ Signs the lease before modelling digital-channel unit economics, then finds the commission on the first settlement.
- ✗ Buys equipment for the optimistic case: six projected virtual brands, one actually operating.
- ✗ Launches with 38-52 references to 'see what sticks', pushing ticket time to 22-28 minutes.
- ✗ Costs the plate without packaging, channel waste or commission, so real food cost lands at 36-41%.
- ✗ Concentrates 100% of sales on one aggregator and forfeits any negotiating leverage.
- ✗ Mistakes the absence of a dining room for margin and never touches channel pricing.
- ✗ Tracks gross sales in the platform dashboard and never contribution margin per SKU.
- ✗ Opens brand two in month 3, while brand one still has no stable theoretical cost.

What the Masterrestaurant method does MASTERRESTAURANT

- ✓ Models the channel P&L before the lease: contracted commission, packaging, waste, acquisition and logistics inside the plate.
- ✓ Sizes the line to a real 8-12 SKU mix sharing 70% of inputs, with 70-80% utilisation target.
- ✓ Sets channel price backwards from commission, holding contribution margin at 52% or better after the platform.
- ✓ Keeps food cost at 32% or lower per dish and compares theoretical against actual cost every week.
- ✓ Consolidates order intake on a single board and fires variance alerts before month-end close.
- ✓ Builds an owned channel from day 30 with WhatsApp and direct ordering, reaching 30-45% commission-free sales.
- ✓ Computes break-even in orders per day and stresses it at 5%, 12% and 20% input inflation.
- ✓ Opens brand two only after three consecutive months of net-of-commission margin at 18% or above.

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THE NUMBERS THAT MATTER

Market indicators that frame the decision

61.7%

of cloud kitchen revenue held by the independent segment (2025)

1200+

active dark kitchens in Mexico City, up 40% since 2023

87%

of Brazil's e-food bookings concentrated by iFood (2024)

39
BN USD

the Latin American meal delivery segment will exceed in 2027

26.1%

of the US delivery market held by Uber Eats at the end of 2024

90%

order completion rate with voice AI at White Castle, ~60 s per order

VISUALIZATION

The numbers, visualized

of cloud kitchen revenue held by the independent segment (2025)



active dark kitchens in Mexico City, up 40% since 2023



of Brazil's e-food bookings concentrated by iFood (2024)



the Latin American meal delivery segment will exceed in 2027



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Sources: [Grand View Research 2025](#) · [CANIRAC 2025](#) · [Statista 2024](#) · [Earnest Analytics 2024](#) · [SoundHound \(Restaurant Dive\) 2024](#)

Chart by [masterrestaurant.com](#)

REAL CASE

“We arrived with 41 references across two virtual brands in a 26-square-metre kitchen, billing 480 thousand dollars a year at 38% food cost, with 96% of sales on one aggregator charging 27%: contribution margin after the platform sat at 14%, and cash flow would not survive month 5. We cut to 9 SKUs sharing 70% of inputs, pulled packaging and waste into the recipe spec until food cost fell to 31,4%, lifted channel price 9% above the direct-order price and opened WhatsApp with our own menu. Within five months ticket time dropped from 24 to 13 minutes, errors from 7% to 1,8%, the owned channel reached 31% of sales and net-of-commission contribution margin rose to 21,6%; the 38 thousand dollars of retrofit came back in seven months.”

— Dark kitchen operation with two virtual brands, revenue band under 500 thousand USD a year, Latin American urban market

HOW TO APPLY IT IN YOUR RESTAURANT

A 90-day roadmap to start a dark kitchen from scratch

1

Days 1-15 · Model unit economics before signing anything

Build the per-unit P&L around your target average ticket and subtract, in this order, contracted aggregator commission, packaging, channel waste and acquisition cost; plate food cost has to close at 32% or below including packaging, which is the ceiling in the Masterrestaurant costing rule, not the goal. Compute break-even in orders per day: fixed monthly costs divided by unit contribution margin, then divided by 30. Walk properties with that number in hand, because a lease demanding 140 daily orders in a neighbourhood that barely moves 70 is not a property, it is a trap. Set the year-one revenue band here —under 500 thousand USD for a single-brand kitchen, 500 thousand to 1 million if the market carries two— and do not move it out of enthusiasm.

2

Days 16-40 · Size the line to the mix, not to the ambition

Define 8 to 12 SKUs sharing at least 70% of inputs and build the line for that mix, targeting 70% to 80% equipment utilisation; any equipment that sits below 40% use in the base case gets deferred against proven revenue rather than bought just in case. Write a costed spec for every SKU with weights, yield and valued packaging, and set the theoretical cost per plate you will later compare against actual. In parallel, negotiate with at least two aggregators even where one dominates your city: in Spain, with Glovo near 31% and Just Eat near 26% of the market (Ken Research, 2025), the second platform exists and gives the negotiation a floor. A short menu is not austerity; it is the condition for ticket time to close under 14 minutes.

3

Days 41-70 · Automate intake and measurement, not the cooking

Consolidate orders from every platform onto one board and retire the three-tablet operation, which is where dispatch errors and lost traceability originate; then switch on weekly food cost variance alerts —actual cost minus theoretical cost over sales— so the deviation shows up on Tuesday instead of at month-end. This is where AI applied to operations actually pays: automated order confirmation and inventory tracking give the owner the administrative afternoon back. The maturity benchmark is public: White Castle's voice AI reached 90% order completion at roughly 60 seconds per order (SoundHound via Restaurant Dive, 2024). Open the owned channel too, with WhatsApp and a direct-order digital menu, plus gamified incentives for repeat customers.

4

Days 71-90 · Stress the model and fix the board KPIs

Run the model through three input-inflation scenarios —5%, 12% and 20%— and determine in each how many daily orders you need and how much channel price must move to hold margin; if the 20% case breaks break-even with no remedy, the problem is structural rather than cyclical and the mix needs revision before any scaling. Close the quarter with a five-KPI board a director can read in two minutes: net-of-commission contribution margin, food cost variance, ticket time, error rate and share of sales through the owned channel. Set 3, 6 and 12-month targets and tie the brand-two decision to an arithmetic threshold: three straight months above 18% net-of-commission margin. Without that threshold, expansion is a wager.

FAQ**Questions owners ask while building their first kitchen****How much does it cost to start a dark kitchen from scratch in 2026?**

For a 20 to 35-square-metre kitchen with one virtual brand and 8-12 SKUs, sensible CapEx runs USD 28.000 to USD 55.000 across equipment, fit-out and initial working capital. The figure that ruins operations is not the low one: it is the USD 85.000 to 140.000 spent on lines sized for brands that do not exist yet, with equipment utilisation below 40%.

Should I sell only through aggregators like Rappi or iFood, or open my own channel?

Both, with distinct roles and in that order: aggregators supply immediate demand and discovery, the owned channel supplies margin and repeat purchase. Concentration justifies caution, with iFood at 87% of Brazilian e-food bookings (Statista, 2024). The twelve-month target is 55-70% of sales on platforms and 30-45% through direct ordering and WhatsApp.

What food cost should a dark kitchen run to be profitable?

32% as a MAXIMUM per dish, not as a target, and that percentage must include packaging and the waste specific to the digital channel, which is exactly where most costing falls apart. Payroll, rent and utilities are not loaded onto the plate: they belong to break-even, which is why break-even is expressed in orders per day.

When does a second virtual brand in the same kitchen make sense?

When the first holds three consecutive months with net-of-commission contribution margin above 18%, error rate under 2% and ticket time below 14 minutes. Independents hold 61,7% of cloud kitchen revenue (Grand View Research, 2025), so the opportunity is real; what is not real is the shortcut of doubling brands before stabilising the first.


DATA & SOURCES

Sector data 2026 (official sources)

Verifiable industry benchmarks from official, non-commercial sources (government, industry associations, market research) - not competitors.

Metric	Benchmark 2026	Source
CAGR del mercado de ghost kitchens 2022-2032	11.65% anual	Statista/Toast (vía OysterLink)
Inversión inicial de una ghost kitchen	USD 75.000–200.000	OysterLink 2025
Ghost kitchens activas en EE. UU.	≈7.606 operaciones	OysterLink 2025
Margen de las ghost kitchens de alto desempeño	10–30% (vs 3–5% del restaurante tradicional)	OysterLink 2025
Mercado de ghost/cloud kitchens	mercado global en fuerte crecimiento de doble dígito (CAGR)	Statista · Ghost kitchens
Estructura de la industria de ghost kitchens (EE.UU.)	tamaño y número de operaciones en informe de industria	IBISWorld · Ghost Kitchens (US)

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